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CHAPTER 3 
PUNISHMENT: 
DROP CITY AND THE UTOPIAN COMMUNES 
 
If the preceding chapter’s discussion on the human inclination toward cooperation has 
you feeling all touchy-feely, with the urge to sing Kumbaya, hang on. The feeling may soon go 
away. What happens when a group member refuses to join in the group’s cooperative spirit and 
instead seeks to take advantage of others? What is the group to do? Ignore him? Persuade him? 
Punish him?  
The use of punishment has been energetically opposed by a host of modern scholars and 
reformers. In expressing an increasingly popular view, one scholar explained “the institution of 
criminal punishment is ethically, politically, and legally unjustifiable. . . . [A] society concerned 
about protecting all of its members from violations of their claims of right should rely on 
institutions other than criminal punishment.”1 Indeed, one of today’s most influential penal 
policy scholars, David Garland, professor of sociology and law at New York University, echoes 
the philosophy: “It is only the mainstream processes of socialization (internalized morality and 
the sense of duty, the informal inducements and rewards of conformity, the practical and cultural 
networks of mutual expectation and interdependence, etc.) which are able to promote proper 
conduct on a consistent and regular basis.” Thus, “punishment is never fated to ‘succeed’ to any 
great degree.” A society “which intends to promote disciplined conduct and social control will 
concentrate not upon punishing offenders but upon socializing and integrating young citizens—a 
work of social justice and moral education rather than penal policy.”2 
In the magical years of the 1960s social revolution, groups of people not only talked about the 
destructive effects of punishment but put their beliefs into action by establishing antipunishment 
communes. By their actions they would prove the power of noncoercive means of living 
together, a demonstration that could inspire and lead the rest of the world. 
In May of 1965, six acres of scrubby land outside Trinidad, Colorado, were purchased 
for $450 by three recent college graduates. The trio envisioned a utopian community where 
everyone would “be allowed to do what they wanted.”3 The land became home to Drop City, a 
commune whose philosophy was anarchy—not the anarchy of “bombing and terrorist practices” 
but rather one that “opposed external authority, power, and coercion in favor of voluntary 
cooperation and self-imposed restraints”4—a living form of the scholarly urgings described 
above. Any action designed to collectively coerce individual behavior, such as punishment, 
violated the Drop City philosophy of permitting “unrestricted individuality.”5 Members believed 
they rightly could and should individually complain to a person about objectionable conduct. It 
was through the cumulative effect of these personal expressions of disappointment or 
displeasure—the application of social pressure—that a wayward member could be educated and 
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corrected. But coercive sanctions imposed by the group—the imposition of punishment—were 
prohibited.6 
This did not mean, however, that there were no common understandings or agreements 
about how communal life was to be lived. All property was to be held communally among all 
residents. Indeed, the deed to the land stipulated that it was “forever free and open to all people.” 
There could be no attempts to limit who joined the commune. All members were to help all 
others with their projects, be it building new structures or constructing art displays. Meals were 
communally cooked and eaten. All assets and earnings of individuals went into a common bank 
account. Food, building materials, personal needs, and utilities for all were paid out of the 
common account. 
In just the first few weeks of working together, the group built a rough geodesic dome as 
a shelter, planted a garden, began raising chickens, and started several art projects. Visual 
excitement mattered to the group; art was important. Even the refrigerator became a sequin-
encrusted beauty.  
Arriving after the completion of the first dome, an inspired, self-taught engineer directed 
the group in a revolutionary new method of dome construction using reclaimed car tops, an 
approach that yielded sturdy homes for less than $200 each. Many exciting variations on the 
domes were ultimately constructed, for which the commune became world famous. Drop City 
was a dynamic and inspiring community. 
The Drop City commune was ahead of its time. Its members not only talked about the rejection 
of punishment but indeed lived it. They were demonstrating the practical power of the 
antipunishment model for the rest of the world and affirmatively hoped that the larger society 
would come to see its value and follow their lead. 
In the summer of 1965, a man calling himself Peter Rabbit (most residents took on 
fantastical new names when they joined) came to live at Drop City. From the beginning of his 
tenure, he had no interest in the communal activities. He would not contribute to the routine 
communal work tasks, would not contribute to communal art or building projects, was 
combative, and would not share what supplies he had, as the commune’s rules required. While 
the group was very unhappy with him and told him so, they concluded that their nonpunishment 
philosophy prohibited them from officially sanctioning him. 
Drop City was located near a small town. The members had regular dealings with the 
people and businesses there. When Peter Rabbit stole tools from the only lumberyard in the 
town, a business that had been good to the group, the members were particularly upset. They 
feared it would damage their relationship with both the lumberyard and the town. Again, 
however, they concluded that their philosophy did not allow them to sanction Peter. 
Peter spent his time in the Rabbit Hole, as it was called, a dome that the community had 
built for him and his family. His main activity was to write about Drop City in articles that were 
widely published. His writings upset most members because they believed much of what he 
wrote was untrue, because he wrote as though he were the leader of the commune, and because 
some writings defamed specific members and some were obscene and racist (some material was 
seized by the post office). Despite their upset, however, the members felt they could not sanction 
Peter. On the contrary, their philosophy obliged them under their communal project rules to help 
him disseminate the writings that they so abhorred as false and malicious. 
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In early 1967, Peter Rabbit came up with the idea of holding a “Joy Fest,” in which the 
commune would host whoever might want to come and listen to music, learn the Drop City 
message, and discuss art. The majority of residents opposed the idea, pointing out the potential 
for disaster if hordes of people arrived at their subsistence-living encampment. Even if they gave 
up all of their own resources, Drop City simply did not have the means to feed or shelter a large 
group of people. Many members saw the plan as threatening the very existence of the commune 
they had devoted two years of their lives to build. They tried individually to convince Peter to 
change his plans, but he would not. Failing to persuade him, they pitched in to dig latrines and 
purchase extra food. 
The announcement of Joy Fest brought hordes of new arrivals, far outnumbering the 
small number of long-term residents. The residents spent their time trying to keep things 
working, but disorder reigned nonetheless. Sanitary facilities and drinking water were seriously 
insufficient, chaos took over the kitchen, and families no longer felt safe. The Drop City banner 
had been one of people coming together for community and art, but Joy Fest produced a new 
banner—as one member described it: “a place to pursue perpetual fun, where a person could get 
high, maybe get laid, and feel no responsibility.” 
The scheduled end of Joy Fest came and went, but large numbers of people stayed on. 
The members decided that perhaps they needed a policy after all that limited the size and 
membership of the commune. Many of the new arrivals were unstable people with drug and 
other problems, including underage teenage runaways.  The group then also decided they needed 
to adopt formal conduct rules that prohibited illegal drug use. Just as the old understandings and 
agreements were ignored, because of the no-punishment policy, the new rules were also 
disregarded. 
The drug problem became worse. The stream of new arrivals continued.  
 
There’s just so many people coming through here all the time. We used to have 
some rules, but they never worked out. Right now there aren’t any. We used to have rules 
about dope and like that but they just . . . they just never worked out.7 
 
About this time, some members went into town to buy the group’s groceries. By chance, 
they happened to see Peter Rabbit at a local restaurant eating a steak. Drop City had always 
required that all money held by commune members be placed in the common bank account. It 
now became clear that Peter Rabbit had been getting money but not contributing it. When 
challenged, Peter confessed his deception but refused to change his ways and to contribute in the 
future. Despite this, the group concluded, as they had many times before, that they could not 
sanction Peter. But now there was growing discontent, and a growing reluctance of others to 
continue contributing to the communal fund, a fund from which Peter drew support. 
Not long after the steak incident, a Marine deserter named Jethro joined the commune. As 
one commune member describes the events: 
 
 One day a vehicle roared past my dome. I hurried out and saw [Jethro] and Mantis 
riding in circles about the property on a new little motor scooter. Everybody was taking 
rides on it, whizzing around, falling off. 
 “Who does it belong to?” 
 “Us.” 
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 “Great. Where did it come from?” 
 “I bought it.” Jethro skidded off down the road. 
Clard (a community founder) was standing there, looking glum. “The money to 
buy that scooter came from our bank account. He cleaned us out.” 
 
Jethro had been put on the account only days before. The communal bank account 
instantly became defunct. Nobody was willing to put more money into it.8 
With no one any longer willing to contribute to the common account and without any 
means of controlling misbehavior, it became clear that the possibility for cooperative action had 
been essentially destroyed. 
Soon after, the founders abandoned Drop City. 
Friendship and shared values will take a community only so far. Inevitably people will 
have personal conflicts or their differences in values will surface. Some people will occasionally, 
or even regularly, promote their own views at the expense of others, as Peter Rabbit did at Drop 
City. And in many such instances, “reeducation” through individual conversation or through 
social pressure won’t do the trick. Only coercive sanctions—punishment—will have an effect. 
And such sanctions are most effective in gaining compliance and least disruptive to the 
community when done by the community as a whole, restrained and legitimized by the group’s 
collective judgment, rather than imposed ad hoc by one or several individuals. 
Social pressure and the influence of social norms can be important and powerful forces, 
but they also have important limitations. For them to be effective, the person to be influenced 
must care about what other people think of him and must think such opinions more important to 
him than his other needs and wants. That was never the case with Peter Rabbit, and every 
community no doubt has some people for whom this often will not be the case. Given the natural 
differences in opinions and interests among people, strong conflicts will inevitably arise, and 
every society must have a mechanism that will effectively deal with those conflicts by setting 
and enforcing some basic rules. 
Presumably one could carefully screen membership, to permit into the group only those 
who are generous and like-minded in all important respects. And one could exclude from the 
group any member later found to be lacking in this respect. But such membership restrictions are 
obviously inconsistent with the principle of “forever free and open to all people” so proudly 
proclaimed on the Drop City deed. More importantly, membership screening and exclusion is not 
feasible for the general society—the population for which the scholars quoted above press their 
no-punishment regime. The general society must deal with every person no matter how 
troublesome. The only means of excluding someone from the larger society would be to, say, put 
them in prison—but that would be the use of punishment, of which these scholars would 
disapprove. 
One would want rules and a system to enforce them that is fair and just and would want 
the system to impose the minimum suffering possible to achieve its goal. (The general level of 
punishment severity in the current American criminal justice system is probably far beyond what 
it needs to be.) But a punishment system is not an option, but rather an essential precondition to 
effective social cooperation. The community’s core shared values must be respected, and those 
who will not defer to them must be sanctioned, not only to compel them to respect the 
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community’s values but also to assure others that those values are indeed important and do 
deserve their continuing deference. 
The Peter Rabbit story makes the point. Once it became clear that he would not defer to 
the values of Drop City—that he would not contribute his money to the communal coffers from 
which he drew—the communal fund and the commune itself collapsed. Only a sucker would 
continue to contribute to an enterprise that supported those who rejected its core values of social 
cooperation and its shared judgments of unacceptable conduct. 
The real puzzle of Drop City is why its members repeatedly chose to be the easy suckers 
for Peter Rabbit to exploit from the start. When he would not contribute to communal activities, 
they overlooked it. When he stole from the local lumberyard who had helped them, they did 
nothing. When he published writings abhorrent to them, they helped distribute them. When he 
arranged Joy Fest over their objections, they hosted it. It was only the final indignity of 
confirming his permanent refusal to contribute to the communal coffer—after he had been 
caught eating steak while they lived at subsistence level—that brought down the curtain on this 
tragic comedy. 
The story is painful to follow—like watching a trusting and gentle dog get repeatedly 
kicked by its abusive owner. One may wonder how Peter Rabbit in good conscience could have 
so regularly taken advantage of people so obviously trussed up by their own misconceptions, and 
so helpless to deal with the reality around them. 
Even more puzzling is how these people could be oblivious for so long to their role as 
professional suckers and could keep themselves so ignorant about the dynamics of human nature. 
The commune members were not stupid people. Perhaps they simply could not bring themselves 
emotionally to admit that the principle driving their project was so seriously flawed, perhaps like 
Soviet agricultural practices under Stalin, which allowed thousands of people to starve to death 
rather than admit that the principles of effective farming did not track approved communist 
ideology.9 The Drop City members stuck to their misguided principles in the face of an 
increasingly obvious reality until that reality bit them in the ass.  
Perhaps today’s antipunishment scholars have a similar road of discovery to follow. But 
it would be best if we did not travel it with them. 
One can feel admiration for the idealism of the Drop City members and even agree that 
informal social pressure ought to be the preferred reaction to minor social deviations. But at the 
same time, one can only be astonished by their naive folly and wonder whether it was some form 
of pathological arrogance: Humans for 125,000 generations have relied upon an effective 
sanctioning system to assure social cooperation, yet the people of Drop City somehow did not 
need one? Is it that they thought themselves a special breed of human? Probably not—after all, 
they initially sought to include all comers in their project. It seems more likely that they simply 
suffered a blind commitment to a false principle they could not bring themselves to admit was 
false. 
The real tragedy of Drop City is that if the members had taken their early experience to 
heart—as an education about how human groups can and cannot work and the essential role of 
an enforcement system in maintaining cooperative action—they could have saved Drop City and 
its important, inspiring marriage of art and community. But their initial ignorance combined with 
their arrogance to destroy what they had created and what it could have been. 
The modern abolitionist movement, opposing all forms of punishment, and much of 
modern penal theory seem to be playing out the Drop City tragedy. Luckily, it is at the moment 
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primarily an academic game (as much of modern academia is). That means it is not currently 
doing much real-world damage, but it also means that it will probably live on forever in the ivy 
towers because reality cannot reach it to bite it too in the ass. But we need to remain aware that 
this dangerous ignorance is afoot and to make sure it remains locked away in the ivy towers 
forever. 
The people who remained at Drop City, after the commune leaders gave up, lived on 
their own terms. The “UFO Marine” went everywhere with a loaded gun, constantly threatening 
to kill people. Violent motorcycle gangs and speed addicts moved into the artistic domes, which 
gradually fell apart or were destroyed by vandals. 
Peter Rabbit persuaded a well-to-do benefactor named Rick Klein to purchase land on 
which Peter started a new commune, named Libre (Spanish for “free”). But life at Libre was not 
exactly “free.” It was strictly regulated, with rules and with sanctions for rule violations. Libre 
did not allow new members without a close examination of them and their motives for joining. 
Membership required the unanimous approval of all existing members and proof of self-
sufficiency. Each family lived separately in their own structure and had to receive community 
permission to build any new structure. Further, “Libre quite deliberately never built any central 
facility, any common building, where crashers might land.” When a member of Libre was 
arrested for growing marijuana on the property, spending a short time in the local jail, upon his 
return to Libre he was informed that he had been expelled. He was obliged to leave the 
community and the home he had built there. Libre grew and still exists today. Peter Rabbit lives 
there with his two wives. 
Drop City, in contrast, became a “hobo camp” with overflowing latrines, hepatitis, 
violence, and drugs. Ultimately, the “forever free” clause was removed from the property deed 
and the land was sold to a neighbor as a pasture for goats.  
The dynamic at work in Drop City is not unique to that particular utopian experience but 
rather is the standard form of such no-punishment experiments. 
In 1968, as Colorado’s Drop City began to fade, another attempt at a punishment-free 
community was just beginning in a remote part of California.10 Black Bear Ranch was to be a 
radical new model community in which no central authority would compel a particular code of 
conduct by anyone. The founders wondered: “What would happen . . . if we threw out all the 
rules and started over?” One of the founders dreamed “that I would find and establish a 
community—of artists, I thought—who would live and work together in harmony with nature.” 
Following the dream, the founding group purchased a piece of property that had once been a 
gold mine, on which stood a house and a barn. The group raised funds, bought supplies, and 
prepared for the utopian life they envisioned. The commune’s slogan was “free land for free 
people.”11 
(For those readers who can only too easily guess what is coming next, our apologies. 
Being mesmerized by a slow-motion train wreck may not be admirable but, let’s admit it, it’s 
hard to look away.) 
Upon arriving at the property after their fund-raising and supply-purchasing mission, it 
was apparent that the word had already gotten out about the planned commune: The house on the 
property was already occupied. The founders moved into the barn. No one in the group had any 
knowledge of wilderness survival or even of how to perform simple country tasks such as 
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chopping wood. They divided into work groups but then did little work. After four feet of snow 
fell and the group ran out of kerosene for the heaters, one man had to hike eighteen miles on 
homemade snow shoes to bring in more fuel. The commune was free of restraints but also free of 
food, warmth, and sanitation. 
In the bitter winter, the free-sex policy was suspended when the women began to 
withhold sex to protest the lack of heat. Rather than freeze and starve, the group decided they 
needed some rules after all. One member recounted later that “using a combination of 
revolutionary rhetoric, blandishments, and threats, they organized.”12 
But while they created a set of binding rules, they did not adopt a system for sanctioning 
violations of those rules. (Oooops.) Thus, many members still refused to work. When one man’s 
“lack of physical labor and ceaseless sermonizing” frustrated the others, absent communal 
punishment, another resident broke a glass jar of honey over the man’s head. 
The official policy of not punishing wrongdoing applied not only to adults but also to 
children. The children quickly learned the lesson and regularly undertook outrageous conduct, 
such as ransacking or burning the homes of people who would not do as the children demanded. 
The adults, caught by their no-punishment rule, thought it best to comply with the children’s 
demands. In one instance, the children wanted Easter candy and demanded of a man who owned 
a working car that he go into town to get it. The man understood that refusing this demand he be 
the Easter Bunny meant his house would be burned, so he went. 
In the fall of 1969, a group of black militants moved into a cabin and began to transform 
the place into an armed fortress, a guerrilla base. The land was, after all, “free to all.” The 
militants carried loaded guns at all times and followed their own agenda, with little interest in the 
larger group. Although the commune’s principles made all private property communal, the 
militants would not share their supplies. While the commune’s principles required that everyone 
work to support the commune, as in tending the common garden, the militants worked only for 
themselves.  
It was eventually concluded that their conduct was not consistent with the commune’s 
principle of “internal harmony,” and commune members therefore undertook to use dialogue and 
social pressure to reeducate the militants. They were told to “mind your own business.” 
One morning, about a month after arriving, Roy Ballard, the militant leader, forced all of 
the commune members out of their houses at gunpoint and had them line up out in the open. 
Another armed militant was positioned on a knoll aiming his weapon at their backs. Ballard 
demanded to know what the community was angry about, a question that the commune members 
did not quite understand. One commune member stepped forward and tried to persuade Ballard 
to put the gun away. Ballard raised a 30.06 to the man’s chest and told him to be quiet or he 
would be shot. After a few minutes of tense silent confrontation, and for reasons not apparent to 
the group, Ballard lowered his gun and walked back to his fortress. When the commune 
members awoke the next morning, the militants were gone. The strange confrontation ended for 
reasons as mysterious as why it occurred. 
After the militants left, Hells Angels arrived. But the commune members had now been 
scared into a slightly different view of the world. The bikers were informed that the land was no 
longer “free to all” and that they could not stay. They stayed anyway. 
Perhaps because of the scarcity of free food and beer, the Angels eventually did leave. 
The commune members quickly installed boards full of sixteen-penny nails sticking up—a 
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“wicked, tire shredding barricade at the gate”13—to keep out any new residents. The land “free to 
all” was now officially closed to all. 
With outsiders excluded, the commune settled down to tend to their own private utopia. 
But utopia remained elusive. A group of adults charged with child care decided instead to drop 
acid. When the neglected children were discovered, their parents took up sticks and started to 
search for the tripping child-minders, to beat them for their lapse. It was determined that the 
commune’s system for regulating conduct among its members must evolve. Perhaps rules and 
sanctions for violations were needed after all. 
Under new rules, no person could join the community without being a guest for a set time 
period—a probationary period—and then getting a large majority to agree to extend an offer of 
membership. Only two licensed guns were allowed on the property, and those weapons were to 
be kept by the community, not an individual. Failure to keep public areas “restaurant clean,” to 
wash dishes according to an exact protocol, or any other violation of numerous rules would lead 
to verbal reprimand. Subsequent violations of the rules would require an appearance before “the 
circle”—a mandatory group meeting where the violations would be publicly discussed. Repeated 
violations meant permanent expulsion, with forfeiture of whatever the person had built or 
contributed. 
While it can hardly be a model for the larger society, as was hoped—as noted, there is no 
“excluding” people from society, unless one means by that life in prison or the death penalty—
the Black Bear commune, with its written rules and sanctions for violations, continues to exist 
today. 
(A change in track avoids the train wreck. Aren’t you glad you kept reading?) 
Tolstoy Farm, started in Washington State in 1963, was another communal experiment 
of the antipunishment model that sought to follow the standard counterculture values of peace 
and love and noncoercion.14 The group rejected all regulation and tolerated all forms of thought 
and behavior, including drugs, nudity, and free sex. Its only rule was that no one could be forced 
to leave. Tolstoy Farm was to be a place where members worked for the common good and the 
desire for acceptance by the group would itself persuade members to act cooperatively. It was an 
experiment “to prove that man could live noncompetitively without private ownership and the 
external compulsion of law.”15 
(Again, the reader can no doubt predict the coming difficulties. We’ll keep it short.)  
The lack of restraint resulting from the lack of sanctions made life increasingly difficult. 
All purchases were from the communal funds and required a majority vote, but many members 
preferred not to use such things as toothpaste, tampons, soap, or laundry detergent, so they 
refused to vote for such things, thereby forcing their own (un)sanitary habits on others. There 
was also an arson problem, as some members would simply burn the possessions of people who 
offended them. Soon the commune began to slide into dangerous disarray. Something had to be 
done. 
When a resident began shooting at the communal house, he was put in a car, driven off 
the property, and told not to return—violating the only fixed rule the commune had set for 
themselves. But this incident did not prompt a reevaluation of their philosophy, so things 
continued to deteriorate. 
The founding members quickly built private homes in order to move out of the communal 
house. Hart House, as that was called, continued to house newcomers, whose numbers included 
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runaways, drug users, and mental patients—the “crashers and the crazies”—from which the 
founders tried to distance themselves. In the spring of 1968, Hart House mysteriously burned to 
the ground. One account claims a mentally unbalanced girl did it; another that the founders did it. 
The founding philosophy was eventually replaced. Rules were imposed and sanctions 
introduced, the ultimate sanction being expulsion. Drugs were forbidden, and underage people 
without parents at the settlement were barred. Even people who did not manage their personal 
trash properly were found to be unsuitable and told to leave. The Tolstoy Farm commune 
continues to exist today. 
This pattern is repeated in every known no-punishment experiment: After an initial 
period of delight runs into the realities of life and human nature, the cooperative action fails and 
the group either disbands or adopts rules and sanctions (commonly using the threat of exclusion 
as the ultimate sanction). 
To some readers, these stories hold no surprise. The dynamic that plays out here will 
seem entirely predictable, a matter of simple common sense. How could a society deal with 
serious wrongdoing other than by punishment? If the offender is sufficiently indifferent to 
others’ interests or sufficiently convinced of the importance of his own interests over those of 
others, why would such a person change his ways simply because of others’ complaints? In most 
instances the offender knows he is injuring others or at least knows that the victim and general 
community will disapprove, yet does what he wants anyway. Social pressure might work for 
some offenders some of the time, especially for children being disciplined by parents. But why 
would one think that social pressure would be sufficient to get all offenders to comply all the 
time? The puzzle for some people will be: What were these commune founders—or the 
punishment abolitionists of today—thinking? Although there have sometimes been claims to the 
contrary, we know of no society that has existed without some kind of punishment system.16 
The repeating pattern of the stories, showing the importance of punishment to 
maintaining effective cooperation, has been confirmed by a variety of social science studies. The 
studies conclude that people are predisposed to cooperate with others (as discussed in the 
previous chapter) but only as long as the others in their group do not behave selfishly. When 
others violate shared group norms, cooperation breaks down and eventually members will stop 
cooperating.17 Yet the introduction of a punishment can resurrect cooperation.18 
Recall the “public goods” experiments discussed in the previous chapter, in which each 
member of a group is given an allotment of money that he or she can contribute to a group fund 
or keep for themselves. The money added to the group fund gains “interest” and is then divided 
equally among all members, whether they contributed to the group fund or not. As reported 
earlier, most people contribute to the group fund, even though they cannot be sure that others 
will do the same. 
A variation of the experiment is relevant here: The experimenters conduct repeated 
rounds of the process among the same group. As the rounds go on, it becomes clear to members 
that some are not contributing to the group fund (yet are still receiving an equal portion when the 
fund is divided at the end of each round). This is like the Drop City members discovering Peter 
Rabbit eating steak at a restaurant in town rather than contributing his money to their communal 
fund. 
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As the experimental subjects realize the lack of contribution by others, most stop 
contributing, just as the Drop City common fund collapsed. In other words, even people who are 
inclined to be highly cooperative will stop cooperating when faced with persistently selfish 
group members. Being cooperative is one thing; being taken for a fool is another. 
Another variation of the “public goods” game is even more illuminating for our purposes. 
In this version, group members are given the opportunity to punish those who refuse to 
contribute to the group fund (but who will share in its distribution). However, the imposition of 
punishment is personally costly—the punisher must contribute part of his or her own money to 
do it. For every dollar a punisher contributes, the offender will be penalized three dollars. 
Despite the personal cost, cooperators are still punish noncooperators.19 
Even more illuminating is what happens next. Once punishment is allowed, the 
cooperators, who otherwise would have quit, begin contributing again.20 Indeed, nearly everyone 
begins contributing, thereby yielding the greatest benefit to the group and all individuals in it.21 
In other words, the utopian communes could have advanced their agendas—of promoting 
love, peace, art, community, or whatever else they were interested in—if they had understood 
that the one thing they had to do—the one thing that was essential to maintaining cooperation 
within the group—was to provide a system for sanctioning those who violate important group 
norms. A group can dispense with many of the standard norms and restrictions—it can promote 
free love and communal property—but it cannot dispense with a system of punishment for those 
who refuse to defer to the norms the group needs to remain cooperative (such as norms against 
physical aggression or risk-creating conduct). Informal persuasion is a useful first response to a 
violation if the offender perhaps did not appreciate the seriousness of the wrong he was doing. 
But it must be backed by fair and just punishment if group cooperation is to survive. 
Social scientists once described humans as operating in rational self-interest, but studies 
like these have revealed a more nuanced picture. Humans are not motivated by pure self-
interest.22 In fact, people have a strong predisposition toward cooperation. But they are sensitive 
to being taken advantage of and are willing to incur costs to punish others who do not similarly 
cooperate.23 Some describe humans as “wary cooperators.”24 
Once one sees the essential connection between cooperation and punishment, it should 
be little surprise to find that humans, as a species with a natural predisposition to cooperate, also 
are a species with a natural predisposition to punish wrongdoers. Cooperation conferred an 
important evolutionary benefit on humans. As the previous chapter reviews, it helped early 
humans survive in a hostile world characterized by fierce competition for resources, predators 
that were stronger and faster, and natural threats like drought and famine. Cooperative groups 
also benefited from the efficiency of division of labor, shared resources, and the spoils of group 
hunting. It was punishment of wrongdoing that allowed humans to maintain their evolutionary 
advantage through cooperation, and thus it was punishment that was the key to our success as a 
species, and probably to our very existence as a species. 
Evolutionary scientists have puzzled over one aspect of punishment within early human 
groups. While punishment might have been essential to the success of the group, who in the 
group would have been willing to take on the personal risk that came with being the one who 
actually imposed the deserved punishment? As in the “public goods” game, it only takes one 
person in the group willing to punish to maintain cooperation, but why would an individual take 
the risk? Why not let someone else do it? Of course, if all members took this view, the entire 
 
 
Robinson  03-19-2014 
 59 
group would suffer, but it is easy to imagine that each individual might focus only on the 
immediate personal risk rather than the long-term detrimental effect on the group. We are not 
selfish devils but neither are we all angelic heroes. 
The long-term benefit to the group requires that someone take on the risk of being the one 
to impose punishment. If an individual needed to intellectually reason out the long-term cost-
benefit analysis of the choice to impose punishment, would anyone do it? On the other hand, if 
the felt need to punish was instinctually driven, the chances that at least one individual would 
take on the job increases. Some evolutionary scientists argue that it would only take a few 
individuals willing to do the punishing, even if there were large numbers of rule breakers. They 
point to the use of tools and weapons that the group together controlled. A single person could 
inflict heavy punishment at reduced risk on even a physically stronger violator. Others in the 
group might join in to defend a member against an unjustified attack, but not in this instance, 
where the attack is seen as just punishment for the violation of a group norm.25 Thus, a few 
group members willing to inflict punishment could maintain the group’s cooperative dynamic. 
That cooperation helps to ensure a greater survival rate for the group as compared to groups 
without punishment, with that willingness to punish being passed through natural selection to 
future generations, ultimately becoming part of human nature. 
Humans did not invent the use of punishment. They developed and refined a practice 
that existed in a more rudimentary form in predecessor species that similarly depended on 
cooperative action for their evolutionary success. We see rudimentary forms of punishment for 
“norm violations” in other species, especially our close primate relatives, and especially among 
socially cooperative animals. Even nonvictim members of a group act aggressively against 
violators, such as those perpetrating aggression or theft in violation of group norms and 
expectations.26 
Indeed, punishment behavior is not limited to primates. Within the highly-social naked-
mole rat communities, for example, queens appear to focus attacks on lazy workers. Wolves 
apparently refuse to play with those who violate the social rules governing play fighting, and 
violator wolves leave the group and die at a higher-than-average rate. Behavior akin to theft is a 
common target for punishment. For example, elephant seal pups caught trying to nurse from a 
female who is not their mother are not just shooed away. They are often bitten severely and 
sometimes killed. Young male deer attempting to sneak copulations with females belonging to 
adult males are not just shooed away but commonly attacked.27 
The larger point here is that wherever one sees long-term cooperation within a group, one 
also will see a system of punishment for the violation of important group norms—whatever 
norms are essential to continued cooperation. The more essential cooperation is to the survival of 
the group, the more deep-seated will be the commitment to punishment. With cooperation at the 
root of human success as a species, a deep commitment to punishment among humans is exactly 
what one would expect. The utopian communes, or any other human groups, are free to explore 
any and all variations of lifestyle, but they cannot escape the fundamentals of human nature. 
Bring on the free spirits, free love, free lunch, and whatever else human creativity might 
invent, but be warned that it will all collapse if you do not also bring on a system to punish 
violations of the norms essential for social cooperation. 
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LIVING BEYOND THE LAW: A SUMMARY 
 
Narrative Line Chapters and Primary Stories 
 
 The daily carnage and conflict we see in the 
world around us suggest that humans are by nature 
at best self-interested and at worst predators. It is 
the civilizing influence of government and law, the 
common wisdom tells us, that provides the limited 
stability that we do enjoy. But recent science 
suggests a different view of human nature and, 
thereby, may suggest a different effect of 
governmental law.  
 What is our human nature?  If we could see 
human groups operating outside the influence of 
civilized society, its government, and its laws, we 
might know.  And luckily, the diversity and 
unpredictability of human history and experience 
give us a collection of naturally-occurring 
experiments by which we can answer the question.  
As it turns out, the answers have dramatic 
implications for shaping civilization’s modern 
institutions. 
1. What Is Our Nature? What Does 
Government Do for Us, and to Us? 
 Illustrative stories include a Los 
Angeles preschool-graduation parents’ 
brawl and a Miami T-ball game parents’ 
melee. 
 
PART I. HUMAN RULES 
 Contrary to common wisdom, humans are 
not purely self-interested, but rather are naturally 
inclined toward cooperation—as long as they are 
not being taken advantage of by others. And it is 
this natural inclination toward cooperation that 
accounts for the extraordinary success of the human 
species against great odds. 
2. Cooperation: Lepers and Pirates  
 Illustrative stories include the 
1867 forcible exile of lepers to a 
permanent colony on Molokai island, 
Hawaii; the 1972 plane crash in the 
Andes Mountains that led to 
cannibalism; and self-regulation among 
the pirates of the Caribbean in the 
1700s. 
 
 But the critical benefits of cooperative 
action are available only with the adoption of rules 
and a system for punishing violations of those rules. 
Rather than an evil system anathema to right-
thinking people, punishment is the linchpin for the 
benefits of cooperative action that have created 
human success. 
3. Punishment: Drop City and the 
Utopian Communes 
 Illustrative stories include the 
utopian anti-punishment hippie 
communes of the late 1960s. 
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 It is part of human nature to see doing 
justice as a value in itself—in people’s minds not 
dependent for justification on the practical benefits 
it brings. Doing justice is so important to people 
that they willingly suffer enormous costs to obtain 
it, even when they were neither hurt by the wrong 
nor stand to directly benefit from punishing the 
wrongdoer. 
4. Justice: 1850s San Francisco and 
the California Gold Rush  
 Illustrative stories include 
California gold miners in 1848–1851; 
San Francisco vigilante committees of 
1851; Nazi concentration camps of the 
1940s; and wagon trains for westward 
migration in America beginning in the 
1840s. 
 
 However, it is not punishment itself that 
people demand and that promotes and sustains 
cooperative action, but rather just punishment. The 
same human desire to have justice done includes a 
natural distaste for injustice. 
5. Injustice: The Attica Uprising and 
the Batavia Shipwreck  
 Illustrative stories include the 
1971 prisoner takeover of Attica Prison 
in New York and the 1628 wreck of the 
Batavia on islands off Australia. 
 
 On the other hand, while doing justice and 
avoiding injustice are important, they are not 
everything. Emergency conditions, especially the 
need to survive, can subvert them. But even when 
subverted, the desire to do justice and avoid 
injustice is not lost. It commonly spontaneously 
returns when conditions permit. 
6. Survival: The Inuits of King 
William Land and the Mutineers on 
Pitcairn Island 
 Illustrative stories include the 
Netsilik Inuits living in the extreme 
conditions of far northern Canada in the 
1900s; the mutineers from the HMS 
Bounty who settled on isolated Pitcairn 
Island in 1790; and the escaped slaves 
on Jamaica who, in the 1700s, formed 
themselves into hidden communities 
known as the Maroons. 
 
 How can it be, then, that we see a world full 
of conflict and injustice that seems to contradict any 
notion of a human inclination toward cooperation 
and justice? Again, the absent-law natural 
experiments reveal much about how things can go 
wrong. Most prominently, the exercise of authority 
seen as illegitimate, as not acting in the group’s 
interests, can alienate and subvert cooperative 
action rather than build it. 
  
 As part II explains, these and other lessons 
about human nature have serious implications for 
shaping modern institutions, especially the criminal 
justice system by which we seek to control 
wrongdoing among people. 
 
7. Subversion: Prison Camps and 
Hellships  
 Illustrative stories include World 
War II Japanese prisoner camps in the 
Philippines; subsequent transport of 
prisoners to the main islands in the 
“Hellships”; and the 1864 wreck of two 
ships—Grafton and Invercauld—on the 
same Auckland island, with the two 
groups, unknown to one another, 
handling the crisis very differently. 
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PART II. MODERN LESSONS 
 Given the human nature revealed in part I, it 
is no surprise to find that social science confirms 
that people across demographics and cultures 
broadly share certain intuitions of justice and that a 
criminal law that adopts rules and practices that 
conflict with those shared intuitions is one that loses 
moral credibility with the community it governs. 
The research also shows that that loss is disastrous 
for effective crime control, because it undermines 
the law’s potentially powerful influence in gaining 
deference as a moral authority and in shaping and 
internalizing norms. Without credibility, the system 
prompts resistance and subversion rather than 
support and acquiescence. 
8. Credibility: America’s Prohibition 
 Illustrative stories include 1920s 
American Prohibition; and lawless 
northern Pakistan in 1990. 
 
 Is modern criminal law in danger of losing 
moral credibility with the community it governs? 
Clearly yes. It routinely adopts criminal law rules 
and practices that regularly produce results so 
unjust as to seriously conflict with the community’s 
intuitions of justice. While these doctrines are 
commonly promoted by politicians as good for 
fighting crime, they in fact hurt effective crime 
control by undermining the system’s moral 
credibility and thereby its social influence with the 
community. 
9. Excess: Committing Felony 
Murder While Asleep in Bed and Life 
in Prison for an Air-Conditioning 
Fraud 
 Illustrative stories include a 
Florida case in which twenty-year-old 
Ryan Holle is given life without parole 
for lending his car to a roommate who 
uses it to help commit a robbery while 
Ryan is home asleep; and a Texas case 
in which William Rummel gets a life 
sentence for a minor $130 fraud. 
 
 At the same time, the criminal justice system 
regularly adopts criminal law rules and practices 
that predictably produce failures of justice that 
similarly seriously conflict with community views. 
These are commonly promoted as needed to protect 
personal rights, but they do so without an 
appreciation for how the system’s resulting loss of 
credibility damages crime control. Doing justice 
may at times have to be compromised to protect 
rights, but it ought to be done only when and to the 
extent necessary—a dramatic change from current 
practice. 
10. Failure: Getting Away with 
Murder Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
 Illustrative stories include an 
Illinois case in which Larry Eyler, a 
serial torturer-murderer of young gay 
men, is released to kill despite 
overwhelming evidence of his guilt 
because a police officer held him for 
questioning for too long; and a 
Kentucky case in which Melvin 
Ignatow’s hidden photos of himself 
committing torture-murder are 
discovered, but he can’t be prosecuted 
even though he had earlier perjured his 
way to an acquittal. 
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 A loss of moral credibility is disastrous not 
only because it undermines effective crime control 
but also because of where that loss can lead. Once 
enforcement falls below a critical point that allows 
criminal elements to corrupt or threaten the process 
itself, there is no easy way back to stability and 
governmental control without infringing on liberties 
in the most serious way, dramatically more than 
would have been required to avoid the problem in 
the first place. 
11. Collapse: Escobar’s Colombia 
 Illustrative stories include drug-
trafficker kingpin Pablo Escobar’s 
taking control of the Colombian 
government in the 1980s, and what was 
required to regain governmental control. 
 
 The criminal justice system need not be 
stuck with its current sketchy reputation. It can 
change the way it does business by committing 
itself above all else to doing justice and avoiding 
injustice. 
 As part I makes clear, that change is not just 
another in a long line of modern innovations, but 
rather a return to what human groups did before the 
advent of government and law. It is not a modern 
reform at all but rather returning us closer to the 
way humans dealt with one another before modern 
reforms disconnected us from one another and from 
our human nature. 
 Five specific proposals are offered, which 
logically follow from the analyses in part II. 
12. Taking Justice Seriously: Five 
Proposals  
1. Purge the criminal justice system of 
rules and practices that give offenders 
more punishment than they deserve.  
2. Purge the criminal justice system of 
rules and practices that subvert having 
justice done.  
3. See the big picture: Set punishment 
according to an offender’s 
blameworthiness as compared to other 
offenses and offenders.  
4. Create or designate a public body—a 
justice commission—to both promote 
justice and fight injustice. 
5. Regularly ask whether the present 
community’s judgment might be wrong. 
 
 Epilogue: What Are They Doing 
Now? 
 Picks up each of the book’s 
stories where it left off and tells what 
has happened to the people since. 
 
 
